Oakland v. Burns [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
5-1-1956
Oakland v. Burns [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Oakland v. Burns [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 150.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/150
CITY OJC OAKLAND v. BURNS 
[46 C.2d 401; 296 P.2d 3331 
F. No. 19137. In Bank 1, 
401 
OF OAKLAND, Appel1ant, v. FltANK A. BURNS 
et al., Defendants; HERMAN STELZNEH et al., Re-
spondents. 
Municipal Corporations - Governmental and Proprietary 
Powers.-A has all power over that of a 
road which is located on airport property the city in 
its proprietary capacity. 
Dedication-Who :May Dedicate.-A city board of port com-
missioners lacks power to dedicate to a public usc by 
tion any portion of a private road located on airport property 
held by the city in its proprietary capacity. 
Id.-By :Municipality.-Unless specifically restricted, a munici-
corporation may make an actual dedication of land owned 
it just as a private owner may, and the manner in which 
such offer can be made will be the same in both cases except 
insofar as the mode to be used by a municipal corporation is 
restricted by law, constitution or charter. 
Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Right of Property 
-Limitations.-The Legislature may prescribe the method by 
which the power to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of munici-
pal property shall be exercised and, if applicable, the method 
so provided must be substantially followed. 
Streets-Establishment-Dedication.-The mode of dedicating 
municipal property as a public street, as pre~cribed by a mu-
nicipal charter, is the measure of the power to dedicate, and a 
dedication made in disregard of such mode is unenforceable. 
!d.-Establishment, Alteration and Improvement.-Under a 
city charter provision declaring that "whenever" the city 
board of port commissioners "shall" determine that it is 
necessary to open, close, improve, alter or vacate a public 
street within the port area a certified copy of the resolution 
determining such necessity "shall" be filed by the board in 
the city clerk's office, whereupon the city manager and city 
council "shall" initiate the necessary proceedings, the word 
"whenever" indicates that the mode prescribed is exclusive, 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Dedication, § 16 et seq.; Am.Jur., Dedication, 
MeK. Dig. References: [1, 9, 10] Munieipal Corporations, § 97; 
Dedieation, § ii; [3] Dedieation, §[it!; [ 4] Constitutional Law, 
; [G] Streets, § 14; [6] Streets,§§ 13, 18, 2G; [7, 8] Adver:w 
ucoco•co0•va, § 11; [11] Public Utilities, § 26. 
402 CITY OF OAKLAND v. BURNS [46 C.2d 
use of the word "shall" shows that such 
Adverse Possession-Property Held for Public Use.-No title 
can be 
subdivision 
as a 
[9] Municipal Corporations - Governmental and Proprietary 
Powers.-vVhen entity is authorized to exercise 
a power proprietary, the law leans to the theory that 
it has full power to perform it in the same efficient manner 
as a person would. 
[10] !d.-Governmental and Proprietary Functions.-Recognition 
of the that a municipality acting in a proprietary 
capacity must be allowed the powers necessary to perform it 
efficiently and be free from restrictions which impede its 
efficiency does not require that it must also be free from 
restricting provisions which do not impede its specific func-
tion, such as one restricting the manner in which the munici-
pality may open public streets over its lands, or preclude it 
from relying on rules advantageous to it, such as the one 
protecting it against the acquisition of prescriptive rights by 
third parties. 
[11] Public Utilities-Regulation-Scope of Jurisdiction of Com-
mission.-N o constitutional or code provision gives the Public 
Utilities Commission any power of regulation over private 
roads. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Donald K. Quayle, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for damages and for an injunction to restrain the 
operation of limousine or bus service from and on a munici-
pal airport. Judgment for certain defendants reversed with 
directions. 
J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney, and Edward A. Goggin, 
Assistant Port Attorney, for Appellant. 
Rodney H. Hamblin, Joseph M. Hamblin, Donovan, Stuhr 
& Martin and Herbert Bartholomew for Respondents. 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession, § 10; Am.Jur., Adverse 
Possession, § 104 et seq. 
OF OAKLAND 
[46 C.2d 296 P.2d 333] 
J .-Plaintiff 
of zlZ'femlants Stelzner and 
to restrain the 
of certain ordinances 
Board of Port Commissioners 
and of the exelusiYe licc·nse and concession 
403 
tbr board for said servicrs at the airport to li'ialer's Limou-
I nc. (hereinafter called li'ialer 
l'laintitf owns the airport and operates it through the 
in its proprietary capacity. Earhart Road is the prin-
roadway within the airport passing the main buildings, 
vYhi~h are the Intemational 'l'erminal Building, hangars 
installations. Earhart Hoad has been paved and pro-
\vith curbings by the board. Since 1927 the main part 
road has been nsed generally by the public with the 
and without objection from the board, vvhich at no 
took any action to terminate such general use. 
Barhart Hoad has not been dedicated to the public use in 
formal mannet. An unnamed side road of Earhart Road 
the southwesterly side of the International 'rerminal 
and a parking and turni11g area in back of said 
has been used since 1947 for transportation 
for passengers of nonscheduled airlines, and Yehicles 
these passengers for hire had access to thifl 
only by revocable permits of the board and its agents. 
area has not been dedicated to public use either formally 
implication. 
agreement was entered into between plaintiff in its 
and Fialer the latter an 
('xdusiYe license for certain transportation services for hire 
November 1, 1951. 'rhis agreement the trial 
found valid except insofar as it purported to accord 
's exclusive rights with respect to the part of Earhart 
found to be a public street. 
following ordinances allegedly violated by defendants 
found to be valid ordinances regulating the use of airport 
"'"""''T" held by plaintiff in its proprietary capacity but not 
to the public part of Earhart Road: 
Port Ordinance Number 641, which, among other 
prohibits the use of the airport as a base for the 
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for other commercial 
its manager; 
Ordinance Number 786 prohibits solicitation of 
for any limousine or airline bus service 
within the airport or entering the airport for ;;uch purpose 
when authorized by contract; 
Port Ordinance Number 835, which added to Port Ordi-
nance Number 812, section 2.1 prohibiting the operation of 
any vehicle or bus from the airport unless with the approval 
of the board and on its conditions and terms; 
Section 106 of Council Ordinance Number 3083 C.M.S., 
which prohibited the operation or leaving of a vehicle on pri-
vate property without express permission of the owner. 
Since November 1, 1951, Fialer's, under agreement with 
plaintiff, had been the only one entitled to solicit patronage 
for or to engage in the transportation of persons on or from 
the airport in airline motor buses, taxicabs or limousines 
except that defendants might operate on the portion of Ear-
hart Road found by the trial court to be a public street. 
Defendant Stelzner provided transportation with one lim-
ousine from March 21, 1946, to January 8, 1953. Defendant 
McCoy provided transportation with one bus from 1947 to 
January 1953. 
Prior to November 1, 1951, defendants used the parking 
area in back of the International Terminal Building in oper-
ating their vehicles. On that date their permits were revoked 
and thereafter they used only the portion of Earhart Road 
which the trial court found to be a public street. 
Both defendants were duly licensed by the city to operate 
a limousine carrying passengers for hire on the public streets 
of the city. On January 23, 1951, defendant McCoy was 
granted by the Public Utilities Commission a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity authorizing him to operate 
a passenger stage service for transportation of nonscheduled 
airline passengers from the airport to certain points in Oak-
land, San Francisco and Treasure Island over the most 
appropriate streets between the points authorized. Defendant 
McCoy is under a duty to provide ground transportation 
service in accordance with the certificate obtained. 
Within a year prior to the commencement of the action 
defendants had not committed any of the acts prohibited in 
the above-mentioned ordinances except on the portion of 
Earhart Road which the trial court determined to be a 
public street. 
1 !l:JG I Crn ov OAKr,ANn r. BrmNs 
[ 46 C.2d 401; 296 P.2d 3331 
Plaintiff contends that no part of Barllart Hoad is 
street but that in its entirety it is a road 
the airport. 'rhis contention is correct. Plaintiff has 
power oyer Earhart Road so far as the same is lo<'ated 
airport property held by plaintiff in its proprietary 
[2] Plaintiff is right in its contention that the 
Board of Port Commissioners lacked powrr to (1edi-
imp1ieatiou any portion of Earhart Hoa(l to a public 
Rinee the board lacked power to f1e(lieate l~arhart Road to a 
u:se in the manner found by the trial to 
ieation, it i:s unnecessary to <'onsider lwrf~ wheiher an 
<lP<lieation eonl<1 be founded in HllY ('HSP npon eviden('<~ 
nothing more tban a permis:sive use of a rn<Hl by tlw 
for access purposes, which the trial eourt fonn(l "<lead-
" within the premises of the O\Vllt'r. 
It is the general rnle that a municipal corporation, 
RIJPcifically restricted, may as well make an aetual 
off0r of rledication of land owned by it as a priYate owner 
( CaLTur. (1925) § 384, p. 23; cf. City of Oakland v. 
Oakland Water Pront Co., 162 Cal. 675, 680 [124 P. 251]) 
and he manner in which sncb offer can be made will be the 
same in both cases (16 Am .• Tur. (1938) § 13, p. 356) except 
insofar as for a municipal corporation, the mode is restricted 
eom;titution or charter. 
It is likewise the rule that the l~egislatnre may pre-
scribe the method by which t11e power to sell, lease or other-
wise dispose of property shall be exercised and, if applicable, 
the method so provided must be substantially followed. ( Cf. 
of San Diego v. California Water etc. Co., 30 Cal.2d 
817 at 823 [2] [186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747]; JJJiller v. 
20 Ca1.2d 83 at 88 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R 570], 
wlwre Mr. ,Justice Carter, in quoting from Los Angeles Dredg-
Y. C1:ty of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 353 [291 P. 839, 
JJ.H. 161], said : "It is ... settled that the mode of 
as prescribed by the municipal charter, is the 
m<'asnre of the pO\ver to contract; and a contract made in 
of tlw prescribed mode is mwHforceable. ") 
[5] The sanw prin<'.iple applies to yohmt a1·y <lf'di<·at ion of 
property to be a p11 hl ie street. 
In t!H~ instant ca:-:t~, Hll <'X<~lnsiv<; lllodn or Op('lling· 
streets in the port area is prescribed m section 218 
Oakland City Charter, which reads: 
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''Sec. 218. Whenever the Board shall determine that it is 
necessary to open, close, improve, alter or vacate a public 
or part of a public street within the 'Port Area,' a 
certified copy of the resolution so determining such necessity 
shall be filed the Board in the office of the City Clerk, 
the and the Council 
initiate and carry to the necessary to 
effect said '' 
The word ''"Whenever ' indicates that the mode 
while the repeated use of the word ''shall'' in 
the shows that such method is man-
Section 217 of plaintiff's charter prevents it or the council 
from performing any of the acts mentioned in section 218 
without the cooperation of the Board of Port Commissioners. 
It is undisputed that Earhart Road has not been opened 
as a public street in the manner prescribed by section 218, 
supm. If the board had the intention and made the 
implied offer to dedicate Earhart Road as a public street 
without substantially following the procedure outlined in 
section 218 of the charter, such offer would have been in-
valid and ineffective. [7] Should it be argued that the 
creation of an easement of a public street by adverse user 
by the public as mentioned above without an actual intent 
or offer to dedicate by plaintiff or any of its agents is not 
the opening of a public street by the board or plaintiff but 
an adverse imposing of such burden to which section 218 does 
not apply, the answer is that such rights would be by pre-
scription and that no title by prescription can be acquired 
against any municipal corporation or subdivision of the state 
in land reserved for or devoted to some specific public use. 
(Civ. Code, § 1007*; Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. 
State, 18 Cal.2d 169 at 172 [2] [114 P.2d 331]; Bartholomew v. 
Staheli, 86 Cal.App.2d 844, 857 [195 P.2d 824] [hearing 
denied by the Supreme Court] ; Reclamation Dist. No. 833 v. 
American Farms Co., 209 Cal. 74 at 81 [6] [285 P. 688].) 
*Section 1007 of the Civil Code reads in part as follows: '' ... but 
no possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long 
continued of any land, water, water right, easement, or other property 
whatsoever dedicated to or owned by any county, city and county, city, 
irrigation district, public or municipal corporation or any department or 
agency thereof, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against 
such county, city and county, city, public or municipal corporation, 
irrigation district, or any department or agency thereof or any agency 
created or authorized by the Constitution or any law of this State for the 
administration of any State school, college or university.'' 
407 
here involved 
excludes the of by 
the fact that section 1238 
lists airports 
of eminent 
uv•'"U'"~ may be exercised. 
is likewise no merit in the contention of defendants 
cannot on the rules of public 
their right to use Earhart Road as a public 
because the municipality defends its right to make the 
contract with Fialer 's on the ground that it oper-
in a proprietary and not in a governmental 
city claims the right to make an exclusive transporta-
contraet at the airport because it appears reasonable that 
the power to acquire and operate a proprietary function 
all necessary power to operate it efficiently. 
vVhen a governmental entity is authorized to exercise a 
purely proprietary, the law leans to the theory that 
full power to perform it in the same efficient manner 
private person would. (Ex parte Hmtston, 93 Okla. 
26 [224 P.2d 281 at 292 [ 4-7]] ; Miami Beach Airline 
Service v. Crandon, 159 Fla. 504 [32 So.2d 153, 155, 172 
A.L.R. 1425] .) In the latter case this principle was used 
an exclusive contract of the same kind as that of 
However, it does not follow from the recognition of 
principle that a municipality acting in a proprietary 
must be allowed the powers necessary to perform it 
and to be free from restrictions which impede its 
vWvH.'H•,r that it must also be free from restricting provisions 
do not impede its specific function, like the one 
the manner in which plaintiff may open public 
over its lands, or that it cannot rely on rules advan-
to it such as the one protecting it against the 
of prescriptive rights by third parties. 
Section 218 of the Oakland Municipal Charter does not 
any restrictions indicating that it does not apply to 
of streets over lands devoted to a public use of 
character, and the rule excluding acquisition of 
rights against municipalities is likewise appli-
cable. 
the certificate of public convenience and necessity 
of defendant McCoy orders him to conduct his operations 
408 CITY OF OAKLAND [46 C.2d 
publie streets and 
authorized.'' Dt:feodant McCo~· 
.Juri;.;didioll of the Public Utilities Commis. 
sion over thl' hu~ aud limou~ine services on Barhart Hoad 
(CaL art. § 2:!; Pub. Util. Code, § 1003) on the 
basis that Earhart Road is a public street. 
'l'lw certificate docs not eontain any finding that Earhart 
Hoad a public street or any decision that the authorized 
Ncn·ice "from the Municipal Airport" must take place over 
Earhart Hoad. [11] Defendants do not contend that the 
Public Utilities Commission has any power of regulation over 
private roads and no constitutional or code provision gives 
it such power. ( Cf. Kuhn v. ]i'err·y & Hensler, 91 Cal.App.2d 
805 [206 P .2d 1 J [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].) 
People v. County of 1Uarin, 103 Cal. 223, 230 [37 P. 203, 26 
hiLA. 659], is not here in point. In the eited case the 
county of Marin had accepted an offer to dedicate, and the 
court held that the acceptance was valid even though the 
statutory procedure was not followed. (People v. County of 
Marin, supra, p. 229.) However, in the instant case, our 
decision does not limit the power of the public or the legisla-
tive body to accept an offer to dedicate. It merely holds that 
in dedicating public property there must be substantial com-
pliance with constitutional, statutory and charter provisions. 
'rhe decision in People v. County of Marin is not overruled. 
'rhe judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law and to 
enter a judgment in accordance with the views expressed 
herein. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J ., Traynor, .J., Sehauer, J., and 
Spence, .J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
'l'he majority opinion in this case fails to give effect to the 
rule applicable to common law dedication of public thorough-
fares in spite of the numerous authorities announcing it which 
are controlling here. 
IJet us look at the facts with regard to Earhart Road as 
found by the trial court (there is no question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support those findings). The court found: 
'' 'rhe Oakland Municipal Airport was first established in the 
year 1927 upon approximately eight hundred (800) acres 
of land then constituting a part of the 'Port Area' of the 
409 
of 
Earhart 
and are all within said 
Since the establishment 
the roa.dway 
of 
serv-
and installations 
aircraft and other servie(~S 
Said road was extended from time 
awl dead-ended within said airport proprrty. 
year 1835 :said road was 'J~arhaet Road' by 
the Bom·d of Por·t Commissioner-s. In the year 
, the Board of Port Commissioners by ordinance dedicated 
use as a public street or highway a road now known 
Doolittle Drive which was laid out as a state highway 
runs generally parallel with Earhart Hoad in a north-
direction from said Hegenberger Road along and 
of the northeasterly boundary of said airport, and 
City of Alameda. Thereafter aecess roads were estab-
lished between Earhart Road at and near its northwesterly 
and said Doolittle Drive. Said connecting roads were 
at or about the time Doolittle Drive was laid out and 
as a public street. Said Earhart Road is the 
road serving sa1"d airport and the bttilclings and 
businesses lowtcd thereon. The International Terminal Build-
(used as a passenger station for non-scheduled airline 
fronts on the southwesterly side of Earhart Road 
situated approximately seven hundred eighty (780) 
feet sonthvvesterly along Earhart Road from its commence-
ment at Ilegrnberger Road .... 
"Said Earhart Road . . . [was] paved and said Earhart 
Howl ,,·idened by Raid Board of Port Commissioners and wert~ 
at all times maintained by said Board. Said Board eaused 
to be ereete<l along the edges of said roadways and 
delineated said on maps and ehartR of the Oakland 
Airport on file in the office of ihe Chief 
of tht• Hoartl 
1.9:37 tll c 
of Port Commissioners .... Since 
Earl1art Road hereinafter spccifi-
usecl gcnrrally by the public with 
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the of and without objection the Board 
Port Commissioners which at no time took any action to ter-
minate such general use." (Emphasis added.) Thus every-
thing which is ever necessary to common law 
has occurred. It -vvould be difficult to conceive a more 
plain case for the application of the implied 
common law the majority while 
acknowledging the rule of such concludes that it 
did not occur because was not had with 
217 and 218 of the Oakland Charter. Those sections provide 
nothing more than that dedication for roads may be initiated 
by resolution of the Board of Port Commissioners and com-
pleted by the city council. Section 217 reads: "No fran-
chise shall be granted, no property shall be acquired or sold, 
no street shall be opened, altered, closed or abandoned, and 
no sewer, street, or other public improvement shall be located 
or constructed in the 'Port Area' by the City of Oakland, 
or the Council thereof, without the approval of the Board.'' 
Section 218 reads: "Whenever the Board shall determine 
that it is necessary to open, close, improve, alter or vacate a 
public street, or part of a public street within the 'Port Area,' 
a certified copy of the resolution so determining such necessity 
shall be filed by the Board in the office of the City Clerk, 
whereupon the City Manager and the City Council shall 
initiate and carry to completion the proceedings necessary 
to effect said proposal." (Oakland City Charter, § § 217. 
218.) 
First, looking at the law on implied dedication we find the 
following: A municipal corporation may make a common 
law dedication of its property for a street the same as privatr 
owners. It is said: ''A municipality may itself dedicate 
property, unless specially restricted, as may the state. Like-
wise towns, and school authorities, have been held to have 
this power." (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), 
§ 33.14.) (See 16 Am.Jur., Dedication, § 13; County of Yo~o 
v. Barney, 79 Cal. 375 [21 P. 833, 12 Am.St.Rep. 152].) Here 
there has been more than a mere offer to dedicate contrary 
to the intimation of the majority opinion. The dedication 
is an accomplished fact by reason of the various things found 
by the trial court. Nor is the part of the rule that a munici-
pality may dedicate its property unless restricted by law, 
applicable, because the land is of a character which may be 
dedicated and section 218 is not such a restriction. It only 
provides one way in which a dedication may be made. 
OF OAKLAND V. BURNS 
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411 
argues, that section 218 is the 
which there may be a dedication the city. 
section says that the Board of Port Commissioners 
determine by resolution when it is necessary to "open" 
and the council proceeds from there on. There 
reasons why that section does not prevent the 
common law dedication. It does not purport to 
such dedication and at most is one method 
it may be accomplished. It cannot be said to be a 
on the power of a city to dedicate its property, as 
the majority opinion, for the rule that a statute 
measure of the power of a local governmental agency 
apply to chartered cities. "[B] y accepting the privi-
autonomous rule the city has all powers over municipal 
otherwise lawfully exercised, subject only to the clear 
limitations and restrictions contained in the char-
The charter operates not as a grant of power, but as an 
instrument of limitation and restriction on the exercise of 
power over all municipal affairs which the city is assumed to 
possess; and the enumeration of powers does not constitute an 
or limitation. (West Coast Advertising Co. v. San 
14 Cal.2d 516, 521-522, 525 [95 P.2d 138] and 
cited .... As recognized in the \Vest Coast Advertising 
the levy of taxes for city purposes is a municipal affair; 
treatment and disposal of city sewage and 
of contracts therefor are likewise municipal 
(Loop Lumber Co. v. Van Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228, 
P. 600] ) , and neither rnay be held to be circum-
scribed except as expressly limited by the charter provisions. 
An ndes of statutory construction as applied to charter 
. . . are subordinate to this controlling principle. 
The former guide-that municipalities have only the powers 
eonferred and those necessarily incident thereto. . . . A con-
struction in favor of the exercise of the power and against 
the existence of any limitation or restriction thereon which 
is Hot expressly stated in the charter is clearly indicated. So 
reason dictates that the full exercise of the power is 
nf'rm,,tte>rl except as clearly and explicitly curtailed. Thus in 
the city's charter a restriction on the exercise of 
power may not be implied.'' (Emphasis added; 
Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 598-599 
P.2d 894].) Thus in the instant case sections 217 and 
218 do not clearly or explicitly prohibit the city from making 
'l'he board must approve 
Pstabl 'l'hc board may express 
resolution but tllat is the formal way of 
it it does not cxelude the informal method em-
bodied in common law dedication which may occur when the 
conduct on the of the occurs as is found 
such de<lication may result when the formal pro-
for dedication are defective. As said in People v. 
103 Cal. 223, 229 [37 P. 203, 26 L.R.A. 
'' 'fhat the general public used the road as a public 
is established by the evidence beyond reasonable 
<loubt. It is sai<l that all of this testimony fails to establish 
a statutory dedication of the highway. This may be con-
ceded, but 'in many instances a dedication invalid as a statu-
tm·y one will be a good corrmwn-law dedication.' (Elliott on 
Hoads and Streets, 85, 86.)" (Emphasis added.) And it is 
said: ''An incomplete or defective statutory dedication or 
an ineffectual attempt to make a statutory dedication will, 
when accepted by the pnblic or when rights are acquired under 
it by third persons, operate as a common-law dedication." 
(16 Am.Jur., Dedication, §52.) This is further established 
by the many cases that hold that although an acceptance 
of the street by the municipality or other government agency 
is necessary to complete a dedication, yet this may be shown 
by conduct by the ageney sueh as was found in this case even 
though the statutory procedure for acceptance was not fol-
lowed. (People v. County of Marin, supra, 103 Cal. 223; 
1licGinn v. State Board of Harbor Comrs., 113 Cal.App. 695, 
703-704 [299 P. 100] ; Fitzgerald v. Smith, 94 Cal.App. 480 
[271 P. 507]; County of Sacramento v. La~tszus, 70 Cal.App. 
2d 639 [161 P.2d 460]; Richardson v. O'IIanrahan, 83 Cal. 
App. 415 [256 P. 1103] ; San ]i'rancisco S~llplwr Co. v. County 
of Contra Costa, 207 Cal. 1, 6 [276 P. 570]; St. John v. King, 
1:30 Cal.App. 356 [20 P.2d 123] .) It is said in the Marin 
County case, s~tpra, where the county board of supervisors 
declared a road to be a public one: "[A]lthough the pro-
ceeding was not accompanied by all the for·ms req1tired by the 
statute to constitute it a highway in a statutory sense, still 
it was evidence of an acceptance by the board for the public 
as such highway; which evidence, coupled with its uses for 
a highway, and its improvement as such by public authority, 
is ample to support an acceptance." (Emphasis added; 
OF OAKLAND I' BURNS 41 ~) 
next pass to the eontention tlHit 
not in fact 
to 
of 
of as 
s1n,c1 'l'he eontrntion of to 
the subdivisions dPf'eribed in Hw the recorded 
such subdivisions whieh named streets and thorough-
not aeceptcd by the board of supervisors, but, on 
tlw eontrary, acceptance had been denied, and that as to 
thereof accepted, the aceeptanee though granted was 
not indorsed upon the maps. lt is plain that the making 
anr1 rceorclation of these maps was an offer of dedication to 
the of these spaces as thoroughfares and public streets. 
It is also dear from the complaint that no withdrawal of 
oJf:er of dedication has ever been made. The mere 
of the work 'done' and the completion thereof by 
the board of supervisors ?·s, thet·cfore, an implied acceptance 
of the dedicat?:on. Neither could thereafter sue-
contend that the thoroughfares ·were anything other 
public strrets. \Vhile it is trne that the pro-
for express dedication tDerc not literally complied 
ample appears to show that an implied acceptance of 
offt'r \\'11S made the board. v. Coun 
86 Cal. 405 [24 P. 1094]; People v. of 
103 CaL 223, 227 [26 IdLA. 65fJ, 37 P. 203]; Davidow 
2:1 Cal.App. 188 11:37 P. 619] .) " (Emphasis 
addr-d.) In eonnection with the cases above quoted from, it 
be not('([ that aeconling to the findings hrrc the board 
a rrsolution giving Barlwrt Hoad its llalllf'. Ccriai1Jly 
:mbstantial i:onrplianec \l'illt se(:tions 217 <llHl 2JR of 
i·harter or at lt-a;-;t snffici<'nt to show a eomnJull law otf('l' 
;We<' o!' a dr::1it•a1io1l l!llli••l' thi~ rnlP ~La1<·d in iJI(c 
Couuty and San Franeisc:o eases. \Vhile words of 
such as that the street is hereby cstablishr<t were not 
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the resolution shows 
board of Earhart as a public road. 
To reach the conclusion arrived at the 
above cited cases must be overruled. They cannot be dis-
tinguished. 
The rule for which the stands may have more 
serious effects than are all the 
done by the city here are done on a of land owned by 
the and in reliance thereon millions of dollars of im-
provements are erected fronting on it. It would seem incon-
ceivable that this court would hold there was no dedication, 
would permit the city to erect barriers across the street and 
stop the flow of traffic thereon rendering valueless the invest-
ments in the improvements. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 19386. In Bank. May 1, 1956.) 
BARBARA I-1EE SPRAGUE, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Time to Make Claim-New and 
Further Disability.-The Industrial Accident Commission cor-
rectly determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain 
a petition for increased disability rating filed more than five 
years after the date of injury, though the injured employee 
filed a prior petition for further medical treatment within the 
five-year period, where it was not suggested on the hearing of 
that petition that she was seeking an increased permanent 
disability rating because of any new and further disability, 
where notwithstanding a recital in such petition that she had 
"suffered from increased disability and pain" it was stipulated 
that the "only question" raised was the "need for further 
medical treatment," and where she did not thereafter claim, 
by petition for reconsideration or for judicial review, that any 
issue that had been raised had been left undetermined. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission dismissing petition for increased disability 
rating. Order affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 134; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 409. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 141. 
